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'THE CANON' OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FOR UNDERGRADUATE TEACHING: THE
MELDING OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY,
LAW, AND INTERPRETIVE/EMPIRICAL
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Ronald Kahn*
As a teacher of undergraduates, I want to make the argument that courses in American Constitutional Law should emphasize a wide range of topics, including constitutional theory,
the process of Supreme Court decision-making, and how the Supreme Court brings change in political, economic, and social life
into constitutional law. We should also present students with
some of the methods of analysis and definitions of institutions
and institutional change that inform the emerging historical institutional or politics and history approach to American political
development. I have written elsewhere about the importance of
teaching constitutional theory and the process of social construction by the Supreme Court as ways to bring the outside world
into supreme Court decision-making. The following eight paragraphs are taken from that article, which may be hard for readers of this journal to locate. 1
Intellectual movements, such as Feminist Theory, Critical
Legal Studies, and Critical Race Theory, are central to understanding how political and social change is facilitated through
law. Students want to know how change in constitutional law
occurs and how such changes inform the process of change in the
wider society. The link between such intellectual movements
and legal change requires a consideration of the role of the interpretive community in the development of constitutional law.
Why do very smart constitutional scholars seek to develop new
*

James Monroe Professor of Politics and Law, Oberlin College.
1. See Ronald Kahn, Bringing the Outside World into Supreme Coun Decision
Making, 14 Focus on Law Studies: Teaching About Law in the Liberal Ans 5, 16 (Fall
1998).
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constitutional movements, theories, and ways of looking at constitutional questions? Why is so much passion exhibited by
scholars and their students in support of or in opposition to
feminist, critical legal studies, and critical race approaches to the
law?
One reason for the important role of such intellectual
movements is that scholars are trying to influence the "interpretive community." According to Owen Fiss, the interpretive
community includes jurists, legal journalists, practitioners, legal
change advocates, other scholars, and the informed public.
Scholars are trying to persuade the interpretive community to
accept new conceptions of what the polity and principles in constitutional law should be, as well as how they should be applied.
For instance, civic republicans, such as Cass Sunstein and Frank
Michelman, contend that ensuring rigorous informed deliberation on constitutional matters can only be facilitated by engaging
the general public. For feminist scholars like Catharine MacKinnon, the objective is to demonstrate the impact of genderbased power disparities in society at large on law and the legal
system. Critical legal scholars argue that "the law" is what
judges say it is. Since judges are from the upper class and accept
the value premises of the wider society, such as those of capitalism and pluralism, court decision-making is not viewed as
autonomous from class, social, and political structures in societies. Thus, for critical legal scholars, class, social, and political
inequalities are simply reflected in the law. They therefore understate the force of law and legal institutions on social change.
To understand how the Supreme Court is influenced from
without by social and political forces, students should become
aware of differences that exist among members of the interpretive community on how individual rights intersect with judicial
decision making. Additionally, they should be exposed to the
role that courts play in the wider political system, as well as how
political, social, and economic considerations affect court decisions. They must consider such questions through the study of
conventional constitutional theories as well as in representative
scholarship from new intellectual movements. These intellectual
movements allow new questions to be asked about social and
political change, questions whose answers could positively affect
society as a whole. Examples include: To what degree has constitutional law met the needs of a changing society? Which ideas
central to these intellectual movements have made their way
into constitutional law and why? How is the rule of law affected,
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positively or negatively, by the central contentions developed by
Critical Legal Studies (CLS}, Critical Race Theory (CRT), and
Feminist Jurisprudence? What elements from more conventional
constitutional theory can actually help sustain political and social
change in a diverse society?
Students should also come to see how scholars from these
intellectual movements understand the role of law and courts in
the process of political and social change. They should begin to
evaluate the implications of focusing on the critical approaches
to constitutional law just as they must consider the implications
of relying on conventional rights-based constitutional theory.
Similarly, in exploring cases with students, instructors need to
identify examples in which Supreme Court justices accept or reject premises that are central to these critical intellectual movements. This practice is consistent with what we do in our analysis of more conventional approaches, including our theoretical
assessments of originalism and non-originalism in constitutional
interpretation. For example, why does the Supreme Court talk
of "personhood" rather than privacy in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the decision in which a Supreme Court consisting of a majority of Reagan-Bush appointees
refused to overturn the fundamental right to abortion choice
first enunciated in Roe v. Wade?
Study of these intellectual movements is very exciting to
students because it opens up for them the possibilities and limits
of law in effecting social change. Most importantly, through
comparison of conventional and critical approaches to law and
legal theory, students can ask themselves whether they wish to
participate-as lawyers, judges, legal scholars, or political scientists-in the interpretive community. I must emphasize that the
primary objective in my American Constitutional Law class is
not to produce lawyers or members of the interpretive community. However, one of the major reasons that students become
scholars or practitioners in any particular field-whether the
field is chemistry, political science, or law-is that they see us as
teachers and mentors who enjoy engaging in research and exploring new intellectual puzzles. That is why so many Ph.D.s,
scholars, and legal theorists traditionally come from liberal arts
colleges, where they have opportunities to work closely with instructors in research seminars, in honors courses, and as research
assistants.
There are drawbacks to presenting only one approach to
Supreme Court decision making: students may come to view one
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movement as the "correct" one, rather than affording due consideration to divergent approaches, be they conventional or
critical. If we as teachers were to present only one approach, we
would deny to students the opportunity to fairly evaluate conflicting interpretive models. At the undergraduate level, presenting the competing interpretive frameworks allows students
to make authentic assessments of their theoretical coherence and
practical value. By imparting to students the ability to critically
analyze such approaches, instructors are passing on "tools"
which will be invaluable in graduate, law, and professional
school. On the personal side, although I am an interpretive empiricist and a non-originalist, I am proud of the fact that my students have become behavioral political scientists and originalist
scholars.
However, studying new intellectual movements will not
necessarily explain how social, economic, and political change
directly influence Supreme Court decision making. For example, Justices might accept or reject John Hart Ely's vision of
rights under the equal protection clause, or Lani Guinier's vision
of representation and voting rights. In so doing, one can identify
which conceptions from the interpretive community have affected actual court decisions. However, to explain how the outside world comes into constitutional law, we need to do more.
We need to place the Supreme Court decision making process
into a wider historical framework, beyond the level of intellectual movements, ideas, and interpretation. To do this we need to
ask under what conditions new social constructs come into the
law, which become part of precedents.2 It is quite clear that
2. See Ronald Kahn, Liberalism, Political Culture, and the Rights of Subordinated
Groups: Constitutional Theory and Practice at a Crossroads, in David F. Ericson and
Louisa Bertch Green, eds., The Liberal Tradition In American Politics: Reassessing The
Legacy Of American Liberalism 171-97, 254-59 (Routledge, 1999). See also Ronald
Kahn, Institutional Norms and the Historical Development of Supreme Court Politics:
Changing "Social Facts" and Doctrinal Development, in Howard Gillman and Cornell
Oayton, eds., The Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations 43-59 (U. Press of Kansas, 1999); and Ronald Kahn, New (Historical) Institutionalism: Relating Supreme Court Decision Making to Social, Political and Economic Change,
in Ronald Kahn, ed., 9 A Law and Courts Symposium: Courts, Law, and the New (Historical) Institutionalism, Law and Courts 1, 3, 12-13 (Spring, 1999). Finally, see two recent papers on the role of social constructs in Supreme Court decision-making and
American constitutional development: The Role of "Precedential Social Facts" in Reversals of Landmark Supreme Court Decisions: The Rights of Subordinated Groups to Expression, Religion, Privacy, and Equal Protection, (Paper presented to Panel on Legitimacy of Arguments, Evidence, and Amendments, 1999 Annual Meeting, American
Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 2-5, 1999) (on file with author);
and New Historical Institutionalism, Precedential Social Constructs, Political Culture, and
Doctrinal Change: Gender Discrimination in the Twentieth Century (with Susan Den-
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judges ask what constitutes "liberty" interests in light of a
changing society, as we saw in Justice Harlan's concept of "ordered liberty" in Poe v. Ullman and Griswold v. Connecticut.
Yet too few scholars of Supreme Court decision making have
studied the role and development of social constructs in the law.
Do such visions of society get passed on from landmark cases, as
the Court considers new constitutional questions? What is the
relationship of policy and principles to the way social constructs
are formulated by non-originalists on the Court? Exploring new
intellectual developments can help us gain a more precise understanding of social constructs in the law and begin to see how they
effect change.
My students are excited about studying intellectual movements and appropriating ideas from a wide range of scholars to
construct their own conceptions of the role of law in ameliorating problems of race, gender, and class in our society. Critical
engagement with these differing theoretical traditions helps students synthesize, as well as controvert, ideas that they encounter
in other courses. Indeed, this is the very mark of a serious liberal arts education. Additionally, it brings great pleasure to
teach American Constitutional Law at the undergraduate level
precisely because there are many important issues which are best
illuminated at the intersection of the humanities and social sciences. Studying intellectual movements stimulates such crosscurrents of knowledge. By examining the role that courts play as
forums for social change and introducing different views about
what values should be incorporated into constitutional law, students learn to both respect and question different perspectives
on constitutional interpretation.
In arguing for the inclusion of constitutional theory and the
process through which the Supreme Court brings the outside social, economic, and political world into its decision making, I am
taking issue with some, but not all, of what my colleagues in this
discussion group are advocating.
I am asking that we do more than expand the cases which
are considered necessary for the teaching of constitutional law.
We have seen numerous examples of this in the articles in this
Symposium. Some make valid arguments for innovation in "the
taught" canon and constitutional law textbooks, with insights on
nehy) (paper presented to Panel on Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Courts,
1999 Annual Meeting, Western Political Science Association, Seattle, WA, Mar. 25-27,
1999) (on file with author).
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the pedagogical advantages and disadvantages of such changes
for law school students. Louis Fisher wants students using his
textbook to study the dialogue among the judiciary, Congress,
the president, the states and the general public, and the role of
the Supreme Court and courts in our political system. John
Nowak explores the role of casebooks in law school teaching and
the development of his textbook in the future. William Banks
and Daan Braveman discuss how their law school text differs
from others by including additional material on the structure of
government and the integration of constitutional theory and doctrine with practical problems. J. M. Balkin and Sandy Levinson
question the role of constitutional theory in law school teaching.
They argue that "constitutional theories actually tend to avoid
putting the basic justice of the legal system into question by offering intricate and intellectually demanding forms of legal
analysis as a substitute for and are a diversion from potentially
de-legitimating inquiries about our constitutional system." 3
Many contributors make arguments for including in 'the
canon' contributions from outside the courtroom and what
Owen Fiss has called "the interpretive community.''4 One might
argue that they are seeking to expand the definition of the interpretive community.5 J.M. Balkin and Sandy Levinson, in what
may be called keynote contributions for discussion, make superb
arguments as to what the term canon means and why and how
we should expand it.6 They call for law professors to expand the
contribution of non-governmental, non-judicial, and nonprofessionally trained lawyers, such as Frederick Douglass, to
the canon of constitutionallaw.7 They argue for the inclusion
into the canon of the words of leaders of social movements. I
agree with them that students should not view constitutional law
simply as a history of great jurists, because at key times throughout our history, including today, the words of important agents
of social change in and out of government are central to the de3. See J. M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,l11
Harv. L. Rev. 963, 1020-2021 (1998).
4. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739
(1982) (urging recovery of "an old and familiar idea ... that adjudication is a form of interpretation").
5. See generally Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory,
1953-1993 (U. Press of Kansas, 1994), for an analysis of the limitations of viewing Supreme Court decision making in instrumental rather than constitutive terms and an
analysis of how the interpretive community informs the development of constitutional
law in the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist eras of the Supreme Court.
6. See Balkin and Levinson,lll Harv. L. Rev. at 970-1002 (cited in note 3).
7. See id at 1023.
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velopment of constitutional questions, although their words are
not viewed as part of the taught canon. They argue that judgecentered law "neglects the fact that constitutional changes-including changes in constitutional interpretation-are often the result of mass political action, which is later recognized and sanctified by various legal and judicial elites. "8
Levinson and Balkin argue that constitutional law textbooks, like their own, should place more emphasis on the realities of American politics: if constitutional law teachers do this,
then the nature of the scholarly and pedagogical problematics
will be quite different than those of too many law professors,
who center their teaching on the counter-majoritarian difficulty
of the Supreme Court. 9 Through the expansion of "the canon,"
legal academics will ask more than whether courts should defer
to legislatures or wait for the creation of new rights through the
amendment process. They argue th<&t constitutional law teachers
and scholars should ask themselves instead "whether judicial decisions do not already reflect the political and ideological struggles playing out in the larger culture, translated into the professional discourse of the law." 1°For example, Levinson and Balkin
suggest that the issue of homosexual rights is important in the
Supreme Court, and in lesser courts, because of the development
of a social movement that has forced courts to acknowledge that
how we treat gay men and lesbians is a legal problem facing our
nation, with Justices and judges now "discovering" rights in response to a social movement that has existed outside the courts
. It
f or a l ong time.
Levinson and Balkin make the argument for an expansion
of the canon because they believe all Americans have the right
and duty to interpret the Constitution and decide for themselves
what it means. For this reason, expansion of the canon should
be the pedagogical strategy for all teachers of constitutional law,
at both the law school and undergraduate levels. According to
Levinson and Balkin, constitutional law teachers have a responsibility to understand that the development of the law is not simply a creation of courts, but of courts responding to social
movements and the world outside. Such study, they say, will also
reduce the degree to which students blindly respect the law and
the major formal institutions which interpret it-the Supreme
8. Id at 1022.
9. See id
10. Id at 1023.
11. See id
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Court, lower federal courts, and state courts. This concern for
the expansion of the canon is based on our admission that the
oppression of many of our citizens has been a central part of our
history to this day, and that the Supreme Court and lesser courts,
compared to legislatures at all levels and mass politics, have not
always led us to see and reduce that oppression. Law and legal
change may have been socially transformative, but the Supreme
Court and lesser courts have not always led this transformation. 12
While I agree that the Constitution outside the Court
should be studied, I question whether such a bright line should
be drawn as Balkin and Levinson do between law and politics. I
also question their downplaying of the impact of the role played
by the Supreme Court and lesser courts on social change, compared to outside court political action. Also, they too frequently
assume that the Supreme Court is not considering the social,
economic, and political realities of the day as it makes constitutional choices, and that only the introduction into the canon of
the words of leaders of mass movements will meet this problem.
Moreover, they do not address the process through which there
is a cross-fertilization between political, economic, and social
changes in the wider society. I think that the introduction of the
words of leaders of mass movements into the canon is not a sufficient palliative for this needed cross-fertilization. However, as
argued above, emphasizing the study of Supreme Court decision
making, specifically with regard to the introduction of social constructions by the Supreme Court and lesser appellate courts, into
case law as precedents, and the impact of constitutional theory
on such introductions, may do more to help us understand the
Constitution outside the courts than simply adding new cases
and introducing students to the ideas of leaders of social movements. The study of constitutional theory, which is oftentimes
built upon constitutional scholars' views as to what aspects of social, economic, and political life must be brought into the law,
may do more to expand the canon of constitutional law vertically, and get our students to engage in such a process of change,
than the addition of this or that set of admittedly important cases
that have been ignored for too many years.
In making this argument, I join Mark Graber, who urges us
to expand the cases that we as constitutional law teachers should
know, so that teachers in and out of law schools place into the
canon insights from political science and history, thereby con12.

See id at 1021-24.

2000]

SYMPOSIUM: KAHN

407

tinuing the process through which the study of constitutional law
is inter-disciplinary. 13 I agree that we must draw upon the best
work from political science, political culture, the sociology of
mass movements, and social history, as the contributions of
Louis Fisher, Maxwell L. Stearns, and William Wiecek also emphasize.
This trend towards the inter-disciplinary study of constitutional law is visible in much recent work in constitutional law
and political science. Mark Tushnet's superb Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts builds on his prior work, Red,
White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law .14 In
Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts, Tushnet argues
for a "populist" constitutional law in which judicial decisions do
not receive special consideration; he recommends that we not
favor judicial review as a process for considering constitutional
15
issues above the broader process of dialogue in the nation.
Tushnet argues for this position because he considers judicial review to consist of a record of errors brought about by the
Supreme Court's refusal to follow the "thin Constitution." The
"thin Constitution," according to Tushnet, includes the fundamental American principles in the Declaration of Independence
and the Preamble to the Constitution, which constitute a set of
16
principles that the full citizenry, not just courts, should protect.
The notion here is that the Supreme Court and the process of
judicial review should not be trusted more than Congress and
other institutions, and clearly not more than the American citizenry, which should participate in a broader deliberative process.
For years Tushnet, Levinson, and Balkin have bridged the
gap between constitutional law/theory and political science; too
few law school-centered constitutional law scholars and teachers
have done this. Political scientists have been bridging the gap
for years. A less than full listing of political scientists who have
been bridging the gap include: Edward Corwin, Walter Murphy,
13.

See generally Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officialing: A Misunderstood

and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 Const. Comm. 293 (1999), in which he argues for

the interdisciplinary analysis of the merits of Ronald Dworkin's constitutional theories.
14. See generally Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
(Princeton U. Press, 1999) (discussion of tension between Supreme Court decisions on
liberty and popular political power); and Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Law (Harvard U. Press, 1988) (examination of arguments on judicial review).
15. See Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts at 182-87 (cited in
note 14).
16. See id at 9-14.
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C. Herman Pritchett, and, more recently, Howard Gillman, Michael McCann, Rogers Smith, and Gerry Rosenberg, in addition
to Sotirios Barber and James E. Fleming, Malcolm Feeley, Louis
Fisher, Mark Graber, and Joel B. Grossman. 17
In addition to Tushnet, Levinson, and Balkin, Cass Sunstein
is another law school scholar who has attempted to bridge the
gap between constitutional law/theory and political science. In
his most recent book, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minima/ism
on the Supreme Court, Sunstein argues for the incremental approach to legal change by the Supreme Court, that is, for the
Court to decide one case at a time and to avoid broad rulings. 18
This would allow the political system to deliberate on constitutional questions and ensure flexibility in the development of the
law. All the Justices on the contemporary Rehnquist Court,
other than the originalists, who are maximalists, not minimalists,
in Sunstein's terms, engage in judicial minimalism, as is evident
in the areas of affirmative action, homosexuality and gender discrimination, and First Amendment issues regarding the Internet
and telecommunication changes. We must consider the validity
of Sunstein's insights on the Supreme Court and social change
and the implications of those insights, if they are valid, for "the
canon" we teach.
However, I must join Sotirios A. Barber and James E.
Fleming, who provide a needed cautionary note on the ideas of
Levinson, Tushnet, and Sunstein. They caution against placing
the idea of the Constitution too far outside the Supreme Court
and the courts. Their comments, and others, convince me that
the responsibilities of an undergraduate constitutional law
17. See generally EdwardS. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L.
Rev. 1 (1950) (arguing that power has shifted to the federal government and away from
the states); Walter Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (U. of Chicago Press, 1964);
and C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values,
1937-1947 (MacMillan Co., 1948) (critical review of non-unanimous Supreme Court
opinions). For more recent scholarship that bridges the gap between constitutional
law/theory and political science, see generally Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged (Duke U. Press,1993); Michael McCann, Rights At Work: Pay Equity Reform and
the Politics of Legal Mobilization (U. of Chicago Press, 1994) (review of "the value of law
for empowering ... citizens"); Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals (Yale U. Press, 1997); and
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The HoUow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (U. of
Chicago Press, 1991). See also the following contributions to this symposium: Sotirios A.
Barber and James E. Fleming, The Canon and the Constitution Outside the Courts, and
Louis Fisher, The Canons of Constitutional Law: Teaching With a Political-Historical
Framework.
18. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court (Harvard U. Press, 1999) (describing "procedural and substantive components" on judicial minimalism).
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teacher are different from those of law school professors who
have an obligation to teach their students to be lawyers. However, the more I read the thoughts of my colleagues here, some
of whom have taught undergraduates as well as law school students, in creative ways, the more I feel that the difference in the
roles of undergraduate and graduate teachers of constitutional
law may be exaggerated.

